278. See HUD REPORT, supra note 201. 279. One panelist who is a fee-for-service broker explains this as his "flat-fee plus" choice, where, in addition to noting the home in the MLS and putting it on numerous sites, he supplies the seller help once the buyer is discovered. In addition to the flat fee price of $495 paid at time of listing, the "flat-fee plus" option needs the seller likewise to pay $1,500 at closing.
at 68 (describing the choice). 280. In an address at the beginning of the Workshop, (then Performing) Assistant Chief Law Officer Thomas Barnett observed that minimum-service laws and policies can be deemed no different from states passing a guideline that states: "When I stroll into McDonald's and order a hamburger, I'm informed that I also have to buy some french fries, because the state has decided that it might be misleading or deceptive or bad if I just got the hamburger, paid for it and didn't realize I wasn't going to get the french fries." Barnett, Tr.
Likewise, at a current Congressional hearing on competitors in the realty brokerage market, Representative Baker analogized minimum-service laws and policies to requiring a customer to have his/her entire home painted when she or he just desired the deck painted. See Hearing, supra note 1, at 30 (declaration of Rep.
Baker, member House Comm. on Financial timeshare trap Services), available at http://frwebgate. access.gpo. gov/cgi-bin/getdoc. cgi?dbname= 109_house_hearings & docid= f:31541. pdf. 281. See Farmer, Tr. at 105 (noting that he completes against conventional "representatives out there that deal little or no worth to the transaction."). 282. See Lewis, Tr. at 179 (" While some customers may be sophisticated sufficient to represent themselves in some or all of the actions of a deal, most are not.").
22, 2005, offered at http://realtytimes. com/rtcpages/20050422 _ dojstepsin. htm (quoting Texas Association of Realtors claiming that minimum-service guidelines would prevent customer confusion); Peter G. Baker, Hiring a Broker: Should You Anticipate Less?, REALTY TIMES, Apr. 11, 2006, available at http://realtytimes. com/rtcpages/20060411 _ hirebroker. htm (" [Federal government companies] argue that with disclosures and waivers customers ought to have the ability to decline any brokerage service or obligation.
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We do not, for example, allow consumers to conserve money by employing medical professionals who cut costs by not decontaminating surgical instruments or cleaning their hands."). 283. See Darryl W. Anderson, Minimum-Service Requirements in Realty Brokerage: A Response to Maureen K. Ohlhausen, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Jan. 2006, at 3-4 (arguing that minimum-service requirements are procompetitive because they cultivate rate settlements prior to going into a representation contract over what a fee-for-service broker will charge for all the services required by law).
See, e. g., GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 16. 285. Thorburn, Tr. at 96. 286. Farmer, Tr. at 73. 287. In addition, in reaction to an FTC questionnaire, participants from Colorado, North Dakota, Vermont, and Washington kept in mind that complaints versus restricted service brokers were minimal or nonexistent. The survey is get more info readily available at http://www.
htm. 288. Our review of fee-for-service broker websites exposes that consumers appear to have prepared access to prices that fee-for-service brokers charge for extra services beyond the MLS-only alternative in advance of participating in a contractual relationship. This finding undermines a required condition for the hold-up theory to be possible that customers only discover the prices for extra services after they have actually gotten in into an unique listing arrangement.
Ohlhausen, Minimum-Service Requirements in Realty Brokerage: A Reply to Darryl Anderson, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Mar. 2006 (discussing various theoretical and empirical reasons the hold-up theory does not appear to use to fee-for-service brokerage). 289. wfg hawaii See Farmer, Tr - what is reo in real estate. at 71-72. 290. Kunz, Tr. at 82-83. See also Perriello, Tr. at 152 (speaking for Cendant, and specifying that "our company believe that consumers.
ought to be able to select their service designs as well as the supplier of those services, whether they be restricted service or full-service"). 291. Sambrotto, Tr. how to become real estate agent. at 116. 292. Farmer, Tr. at 72. 293. PATRICK WOODALL & STEPHEN BROBECK, CUSTOMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA, HOW THE REAL ESTATE CARTEL DAMAGES CONSUMERS AND HOW CONSUMERS CAN PROTECT THEMSELVES (June 2006), available at http://www.
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pdf. 294. Id. at 4-5. 295. See, e. g., Lewis, Tr. at 178-79; Sambrotto, Tr. at 114; Farmer, Tr. at 115. 296. Whatley, Tr. at 45-46. 297. See Katherine A. Pancak et al., Real Estate Firm Reform: Fulfilling the Requirements of Purchasers, Sellers, and Brokers, 25 REAL ESTATE L.J. 345, 350 (1997) (noting that agency relationships can be developed by actions).
Whatley, Tr. at 48. 299. Preventing fee-for-service listings without disclosure to purchasers, nevertheless, may raise issues worrying the fulfillment of fiduciary responsibilities. 300. See supra Chapter I.B. 1. 301. Blanche Evans, Where Realty Associations Base On MLS-Entry-Only Listings, REAL ESTATE TIMES, Feb. 24, 2005, available at http://realtytimes. com/rtapages/20050224 _ mlsentryonly. htm. 302. OHIO CODE 4735.
18 of the Revised Code and negotiations conducted by a licensee pursuant to the authorization shall not create or imply an agency relationship in between that licensee and the client of that exclusive broker."). 303. VA CODE 54. 1-2132( C) (efficient July 1, 2007) (" A licensee engaged by a seller in a genuine estate deal may, unless forbidden by law or the brokerage relationship, provide help to a purchaser or potential buyer by performing ministerial acts.
304. WIS. CODE 452. 133 (6). 305. Sambrotto, Tr. at 90. 306. ForSaleByOwner. com Corp. v. Zinnemann, 347 F. Supp. 2d 868, 872 (E.D. Cal. 2004). 307. Id. at 879. 308. United States v. Real Estate Multi-List, 629 F. 2d 1351, 1374 (5th Cir. 1980) (" [W] hen broker participation in the [MLS] is high, the service itself is economically effective and competition from other listing services is doing not have, guidelines which invite the unjustified exclusion of any broker must be discovered unreasonable.").
See, e. g., Thompson v. Metropolitan Multi-List, Inc., 934 F. 2d 1566, 1579-80 (11th Cir. 1991); Austin Bd. of Realtors v. E-Realty, Inc., No. Civ. A-00-CA- 154 JN, 2000 WL 34239114, at * 4 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2000). A discussion of the various personal lawsuits involving declared MLS-related restraints is beyond the scope of this Report.
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For a discussion of special firm contracts and other kinds of listing contracts, see supra Chapter I.A. 2. 310. See Farmer, Tr. at 74-75; Sambrotto, Tr. at 90. 311. NAR 2005 SURVEY, supra note 38, at 29-30. 312. Austin Bd. of Realtors, FTC Dkt. No. C-4167; Info and Property Providers, LLC, FTC File No.
051-0065; Williamsburg Location Ass 'n of Realtors, Inc., FTC File No. 061-0268; Realtors Ass 'n of Northeast Wisconsin, Inc., FTC File No. 061-0267; Monmouth County Ass 'n of Realtors, Inc., FTC File No. 051-0217. 313. See, e. g., Info and Genuine Estate Services, LLC, FTC File No (how much do real estate agents make per sale). 061-0087, at 6 (2006) (analysis to aid public remark), readily available at http://www.
pdf. 314. See, e. g., Austin Bd. of Realtors, FTC Dkt. No. C-4167, at 17 (2006) (complaint), readily available at http://www. ftc.gov/ os/caselist/0510219/ 0510219AustinBoardofRealtorsComplaint. pdf. 315. Id. at 27. 316. See MiRealSource, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 9321 (2007) (choice and order), available at http://www. ftc.gov/ os/adjpro/d9321/ 070323decisionorder. pdf. 317. See, e. g., United Real Estate Brokers of Rockland, Ltd., Dkt.